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Strategies of Elimination: “Exempted” Aborigines,
“Competent” Indians, and Twentieth-Century




Despite their different politics, populations and histories, there are some strik-
ing similarities between the indigenous assimilation policies enacted by the
United States and Australia. These parallels reveal much about the harsh prac-
ticalities behind the rhetoric of humanitarian uplift, civilization and cultural
assimilation that existed in these settler nations. This article compares legisla-
tion which provided assimilative pathways to Aborigines and Native Americans
whom white officials perceived to be acculturated. Some Aboriginal people
were offered certificates of “exemption” which freed them from the legal
restrictions on Aboriginal people’s movement, place of abode, ability to pur-
chase alcohol, and other controls. Similarly, Native Americans could be
awarded a fee patent which declared them “competent.” This patent discontin-
ued government guardianship over them and allowed them to sell, deed, and
pay taxes on their lands. I scrutinize the Board that was sent to Oklahoma to
examine the Cheyenne and Arapaho for competency in January and February
1917, and the New South Wales Aborigines’ Welfare Board, which combined the
awarding of exemption certificates with their efforts to assimilate Koori people
into Australian society in the 1940s and 1950s. These case studies reveal that
people of mixed white/indigenous descent were more likely to be declared com-
petent or exempt. Thus, hand in hand with efforts to culturally assimilate
Aborigines and Native Americans came attempts to reduce the size of indige-
nous populations and their landholdings by releasing people of mixed descent
from government control, and no longer officially recognizing their indigenous 
identity.
Résumé
En dépit des différences de leur politique, de leur population et de leur histoire,
il existe certaines similitudes frappantes entre les politiques d’assimilation des
Autochtones adoptées par les États-Unis et l’Australie. De tels parallèles sont
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très révélateurs des dures pratiques sous-jacentes à la rhétorique de l’édifica-
tion humanitaire, de la civilisation et de l’assimilation culturelle dans ces
nations pionnières. Cet article compare les lois qui ont fourni des moyens d’as-
similer les Aborigènes et les Autochtones américains que les représentants
blancs percevaient comme acculturés. Certains Autochtones se sont vu offrir
des certificats d’« exemption » qui les libéraient des restrictions légales
imposées au mouvement des peuples autochtones, droit de résidence, achat
d’alcool, et autres contrôles. De façon semblable, les Autochtones américains
pouvaient recevoir des lettres patentes les déclarant « compétents ». Celles-ci
interrompaient la tutelle gouvernementale et leur permettaient de vendre, de
transférer par acte notarié et de payer des taxes sur leurs terres. L’auteur a
analysé à fond le Comité qui a été envoyé à Oklahoma pour examiner la com-
pétence des Cheyenne et des Arapaho en janvier et février 1917, ainsi que le
New South Wales Aborigines’ Welfare Board, qui combinait l’attribution des
certificats d’exemption à leurs efforts pour assimiler le peuple Koori dans la
société australienne des années 1940 et 1950. Ces études de cas révèlent que
les personnes de descendance mixte blanc/indigène avaient davantage de
chance d’être déclarées compétentes ou d’être exemptées. Ainsi, de pair avec
les efforts d’assimiler culturellement les Aborigènes et les Autochtones améri-
cains sont venues les tentatives de réduire les populations indigènes et la taille
de leurs propriétés foncières en dégageant les personnes de descendance mixte
du contrôle gouvernemental, et d’éliminer la reconnaissance officielle de leur
identité autochtone.
Applying a global, transnational or comparative framework to indigenoushistory is a task that should be undertaken with some caution. With their
seductively broad perspectives, such methodologies run the risk of utilizing
conceptions of space and place that override indigenous viewpoints and let us
forget that transnational encounters could occur between different language
groups in very small geographical areas, not just across oceans between large
and powerful nations. As Phillip Deloria has argued, we must be careful to rec-
ognize that the “dynamic, open, progressive global circulation [we celebrate]
today might as easily be named as one practice of colonial knowledge-making
that was, and continues to be, all about the exercise of power and domination.”1
Australian historians Marilyn Lake and Ann Curthoys similarly urge us not to
forget the importance of the nation in our global studies. “The implications of
the tension between national histories and transnational scholarship,” they
argue, “are especially evident in the example of the history of indigenous peo-
1 Philip J. Deloria, “Places Like Houses, Banks, and Continents: An Appreciative reply to the
Presidential Address,” American Quarterly 58, no. 1 (March 2006): 29.
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ples … the danger is disconnection from local audiences and politics, the very
connections that have made Indigenous histories so important and vibrant in the
first place.”2
At the same time, there are numerous examples of scholars who have
heeded these warnings and demonstrated the potential of transnational or com-
parative studies to enlighten us about the international networks employed by
indigenous activists,3 the important story of settler societies looking to each
other for tips on how to usurp territory and control indigenous populations,4
and the insights that can be gained from broadly thinking about the fluctuations
discernable in colonial discourses according to when and where they appeared.5
There is no doubt that comparing settler societies allows us to see colonialism’s
cynical, strategic, pragmatic roots with greater clarity. There was nothing
inevitable or organic about the colonial project, and noting its infinite variations
helps us to understand that.
In Australia and the United States in the twentieth century, for example,
settler governments were busy attempting a similar task — assimilating
Aborigines and Native Americans — using very different policies, vocabular-
ies and systems of governance. In the late nineteenth century in the United
States a humanitarian movement, the younger sibling of the anti-slavery lobby,
had focussed its attentions on the plight of American Indians and orchestrated
an assimilation policy that centred on the Dawes Act of 1887. This Act began
the process of dividing the reservations into individual allotments, and was sup-
posed to transform American Indians with Christianity and education into
self-supporting farmers. In Australia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, separate legislation was passed by each colony and (after Federation
in 1901) state that promised to protect Aborigines. In reality, these “Protection
Acts” segregated Aborigines onto reserves, controlled every aspect of their
lives, and presumed that those of full descent would slowly die out, while those
of mixed descent would be absorbed into the white population through inter-
2 Marilyn Lake and Ann Curthoys, “Introduction,” in Connected Worlds: History in
Transnational Perspective, eds. Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake (Canberra: ANU e-press,
2005), <http://epress.anu.edu.au/cw/mobile_devices/index.html>, (viewed April 2007) 
3 See, for example, John Maynard, “Transcultural/transnational interaction and influences on
Aboriginal Australia in Connected Worlds” in Connected Worlds: History in Transnational
Perspective, eds. Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake (Canberra: ANU e-press, 2005),
<http://epress.anu.edu.au/cw/mobile_devices/index.html>, (viewed April 2007) 
4 See, for example, Julie Evans, Patricia Grimshaw, David Philips, and Shurlee Swain, Equal
Subjects, Unequal Rights: Indigenous Peoples in British Settler Societies, 1830-1910
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).
5 See, for example, Patrick Wolfe, “Land, Labor, and Difference: Elementary Structures of
Race,” American Historical Review 106, no. 3 (June 2001): 1866-905, and Arthur J. Ray,
“Aboriginal Title and Treaty Rights Research: A Comparative Look at Australia, Canada, New
Zealand and the United States,’ New Zealand Journal of History 37, no. 1 (2003): 5-17.
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breeding. Assimilation thus had a very different trajectory in each of these
nations. Nevertheless, there are some striking similarities, which reveal much
about the harsh practicalities behind the rhetoric of humanitarian uplift, civi-
lization, and assimilation which existed in each place. This rhetoric was the
more humane answer to the so-called “Indian problem” and “Aboriginal prob-
lem” that these settler societies found themselves facing, but often these
policies were just as damaging to indigenous culture and lives as the alterna-
tive. In this article, I focus on one particular way that the outwardly
humanitarian policy of assimilation could oppress indigenous people that both
Australia and the United States had in common: the ways the Australian and
United States governments attempted to manipulate who was or was not a
member of indigenous populations as a method of assimilation. 
In both places legislation provided assimilative pathways to Aborigines
and Native Americans whom white officials perceived to be acculturated.
Aboriginal people who showed outward signs of assimilation were offered cer-
tificates of exemption which freed them from the legal restrictions on
aboriginal people’s movement, place of abode, ability to purchase alcohol, and
other controls. Similarly, Native Americans could be awarded a fee patent
which declared them “competent” after an application process that supposedly
measured their level of acculturation and business acumen. This patent discon-
tinued government guardianship over them and allowed them to sell, deed, and
pay taxes on their lands.
Competency and exemption policies have featured only briefly in histori-
ans’ discussions of the assimilation policies of the United States and Australia.6
They deserve, however, more focussed discussion because of the part they
played in what Annette Jaimes has termed “statistical extermination” — the use
of legal definitions of indigenous identity to reduce the numbers of indigenous
people. “If the government could not repeal its obligations to Indians,” Jaimes
writes, “it could at least act to limit their number, thereby diminishing the cost
associated with underwriting their entitlements on a per capita basis.”7 Such
definitions could be, and most often were, on the basis of “blood,” or the
amount of indigenous ancestors an individual claimed; but they could also rely
on excluding those who did not live in indigenous communities, or those who
had married outside those communities, or those who did not appear in the
proper place in the enormous amount of complicated paperwork created by
colonial governments during the assimilation period. Thus, fee patents and
6 The work of historian Janet McDonnell is the significant exception. Janet A. McDonnell, The
Dispossession of the American Indian, 1887-1934 (Bloomington: Indian University Press,
1991).
7 M. Annette Jaimes, “Federal Indian Identification Policy: A Usurpation of Indigenous
Sovereignty in North America’ in The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization, and
Resistance (Boston: South End Press, 1992), 126.
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exemption certificates can be seen to play a recognizable part in Patrick Wolfe’s
“logic of elimination,” the underlying philosophy of the colonial project that,
he says, is premised on the securing of land through the disappearance of
indigenous populations.8
Seeing fee patents and exemption certificates as statistical extermination
goes directly against the humanitarian rhetoric in which they were couched.
The Australian and United States governments introduced these policies as
pathways to assimilation. They were supposed to release particularly accultur-
ated Aborigines or American Indians from the jurisdiction of laws that
“protected” indigenous people with some form of special status, but which
potentially limited those “ready” to take their place in the community without
the protection of special laws. But by “exempting” Aborigines from protection
legislation, or pronouncing Indians “competent,” settler governments were not
just offering partial equal citizenship — they were engaged in drawing sharp
lines between indigenous communities by declaring some members a different
identity to others. This was not only a “divide and rule” strategy; rather it
worked to lessen the population of people classified as indigenous and there-
fore eligible for settler government support.
The particular ways in which fee patents and exemption certificates
worked to reduce the numbers of Aborigines and Native Americans are reveal-
ing of the different methods employed by the United States and Australia to
assimilate indigenous people. In the United States, where the 1887 Dawes Act
had allocated land to individual Indians, competency and fee patents were quite
clearly methods of regaining that land back for the use of white settlers. In
Australia, where aboriginal landholdings consisted only of small reserves and
stations that were merely set aside by the government for their use, exemption
certificates were used to keep holders away from reserves where they received
government support. Thus both were practical ways of reducing government
spending and/or reducing indigenous landholdings.
They were also, I argue, policies which took advantage of the intimate side
of colonialism, which saw many interracial relationships and mixed descent
children blur the boundaries between settler and indigenous. Interracial rela-
tionships are an important aspect of assimilation policies in settler societies,
even though often “assimilation” is not seen as anything more than a cultural
process. In fact, cultural assimilation — the process by which indigenous peo-
ple were taught to “act white” — was often immensely complicated by, and
intertwined with, the process of biological absorption — the idea that indige-
nous identity was slowly being “bred out.” In Australia, where biological
absorption was talked about openly and even became part of government pol-
8 Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology (London: Cassell,
1999), 181. 
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icy at certain times and places, this is a well recognized phenomenon by schol-
ars.9 In the United States, where the presence of an African-American
population made miscegenation uniquely resonant, biological absorption has
not yet been recognized by scholars as existing in the same way.10 Yet as I will
show in the following case studies, the kind of statistical extermination made
possible by competency and exemption was underpinned in both countries by
both kinds of assimilation: biological and cultural.
The best evidence that fee patents and exemption certificates were not
introduced with the best interests of indigenous people at heart is the reaction
of indigenous people to them. Aboriginal people made their feelings clear by
referring to exemption certificates as “dog tags.” Indian resistance to being
declared “competent” took all kinds of forms — written, spoken, organized,
and individual. The next best evidence, in the United States, is the sheer amount
of land lost. In 1934, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, reported to
the Senate and House Committees on Indian Affairs a shocking statistic: due to
allotment policy Indian landholdings had been reduced from 138,000,000 acres
in 1887 to 48,000,000 acres.11 Janet McDonnell, whose 1991 study of assimi-
lation policy is perhaps the best source of information about fee patents,
estimates that 23 million acres of this loss was land that had been fee
patented.12
In the remainder of this essay, I compare two government “Boards”:
groups of (mostly) white public servants who made decisions about the legal
status of individual indigenous people in two very different settler societies.13
Such decisions were made by similar administrative bodies on a huge scale
9 Warwick Anderson, The Cultivation of Whiteness: Science, Health and Racial Destiny in
Australia (Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 2002), 216-43; Russell McGregor,
Imagined Destinies: Aboriginal Australians and the Doomed Race Theory, 1880–1939
(Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 1997), chapter 4; Russell McGregor, “‘Breed out
the Colour’ or the Importance of Being White,” Australian Historical Studies 33, no. 120
(October 2002): 286-302; Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of
Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event (London: Cassell, 1999),
175-6; Robert Manne, “The Stolen Generations,” in The Way We Live Now: Controversies of
the Nineties (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1998), 15-41.
10 See, for example, David D. Smits, “‘Squaw Men,’ ‘Half-Breeds,’ and Amalgamators: Late
Nineteenth-Century Anglo-American Attitudes Toward Indian-White Race-Mixing,”
American Indian Culture and Research Journal 15, no. 3 (1991): 29-61, and Brian W. Dippie,
The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy (Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 1982).
11 Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (Washington: United States Government
Printing Office, 1945), 216.
12 McDonnell, The Dispossession of the American Indian, 121. 
13 After 1943 the New South Wales Aborigines Welfare Board was supposed to include a mem-
ber of “full blood” and another of “full blood or person apparently having an admixture of
aboriginal blood.” Aborigines Protection (Amendment) Act, 1943 (NSW), Section 3.
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across the many decades when exemption and competency policies were
enacted, but here I narrow my focus to two small, contained examples: the
Board that was sent to Oklahoma to examine the Cheyenne and Arapaho for
competency in January and February 1917, and the New South Wales
Aborigines’ Welfare Board, which combined the awarding of exemption cer-
tificates with their efforts to assimilate Koori people into Australian society in
the 1940s and 1950s. Despite the enormous differences in the origins of the
nations of Australia and the United States, and in the ethnicities and size of their
populations, Oklahoma (formerly Indian Territory) and New South Wales had
some important similarities. Both became states in the first decade of the twen-
tieth century: New South Wales along with the rest of the Australian colonies
on federation in 1901, and Oklahoma after much lobbying losing its frontier
status in 1907. Both had significant indigenous populations who had long his-
tories of contact with Europeans. In 1910 Oklahoma had by far the greatest
number of Indians reported for any state, 74,825 or more than one quarter of all
the Indians in the United States.14 A high proportion of this population, 62.6
percent were reported by the 1910 census as being of mixed descent.15 In the
1940s, the New South Wales Aborigines Welfare Board reported an aboriginal
population of 11,485. Mixed descent people apparently made up 92.3 percent
of this population.16
The Cheyenne and Arapaho Competency Board
By 1917 in the United States competency was nearly three decades old. The con-
cept of a “competent” Indian person had been made necessary by the stipulation
in the Dawes Act that the government would hold the title to each allotment in
trust for twenty five years. It was not long before individuals began to request
their trust period be lifted and the fee patents to their land be handed over to them.
In each case, Congress had to enact special legislation to grant a fee patent, or tag
an extra clause onto some Indian-related legislation. By 1906 some government
officials recognized the potential benefits of broadening this process, and making
competency easier and more widely available. The Burke Act of that year allowed
the Secretary of the Interior to issue fee patents, after an application process that
began when an individual approached a local superintendent, who completed an
application, posted it on the reservation for thirty days, and forwarded it to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs. If the Commissioner approved it, it was for-
warded to the Secretary of the Interior for his signature.
14 “Statistics of the Indian Population — Number, Tribes, Sex, Age, Fecundity, and Vitality,”
Bulletin: Thirteenth Census of the United States 1910 (Washington, DC: Department of
Commerce and Bureau of the Census, 1910), 5.
15 Ibid., 6-7.
16 “Annual Report of the Aborigines Welfare Board, New South Wales, 1948,” New South Wales
Parliamentary Papers 3 (1948-1950-1951), 1. 
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At first competency was used cautiously because government officials
were aware that fee patents often led to Indians losing their land to immoral
white real estate agents, mortgage brokers or lawyers. But the Bureau of Indian
Affairs was under pressure from western congressmen to release Indian lands
and slowly became determined to do so using competency as a tool. Of course,
this was not how the policy was officially couched. Rather, government offi-
cials talked about “releasing Indians from federal control” and enabling “the
Indian Office to manage the affairs of the helpless class with undisputed author-
ity, but, on the other hand, [removing] from the roll of dependents the
ever-increasing number of Indians who no longer need Government supervi-
sion.”17
Competency implied equality — it gave individuals a form of citizenship
and allowed them to be treated as white persons under the law, giving them the
right to sell, lease, or mortgage their land. For those in charge of dictating
Indian policy and solving the “Indian Problem,” competency seemed a further
extension of the principles that underlay the Dawes Act. Competency would
only hasten the removal of any special status from Indian lands, allowing them
to pass into the mainstream market, open to demands of capitalism without any
of the protections of their previous special status. But while this impartiality
sounded good in the cool marble halls of Congress, it masked the complexity
of the situation on the reservations where land-hungry white people found it all
too easy to exploit the system. Once an Indian person was declared competent,
they were open to manipulation and deceit. An enormous number would lose
their land. 
The Cheyenne and Arapaho were well aware of this danger in 1917. Indeed
according to Donald Berthrong, while the Competency Board was on the way
to Oklahoma to interview the community, a Cheyenne-Arapaho delegation was
travelling in the opposite direction to ask the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
to call the Board off. One member of the delegation told Assistant
Commissioner E. B. Merritt that, “[w]e realize that if we were given … the
right of conducting our own business affairs and our land turned over to us, that
then all of our property and money would fall into the hands of grafters. We are
not ready to prepare ourselves to compete with civilized people in a business
way.”18 The Competency Board’s records indicate that only 11.2 percent of the
people it interviewed indicated that they wanted a fee patent. The vast major-
17 Twenty-Seventh Annual Report of the Indian Rights Association, 1919 (Philadelphia: Indian
Rights Association, 1919), 30; Francis E. Leupp, “Indian Lands: Their Administration with
Reference to Present and Future Use,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 33, no. 3 (May 1909): 141. 
18 Donald J. Berthrong, “Legacies of the Dawes Act: Bureaucrats and Land Thieves at the
Cheyenne-Arapaho Agencies of Oklahoma,” in The Plains Indians of the Twentieth Century,
ed. Peter Iverson (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 43-4.
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ity, 87.4 percent, stated firmly that they did not want a patent. For ten percent
of this latter group their wishes would mean nothing — the Board declared
them competent anyway. 
The Board covered an impressive amount of ground in the month it was at
work, interviewing between twenty and seventy people a day in six different
towns between 19 January and 23 February. Their record, on 6 February, was
an impressive 84 interviews at Cantonment. For each interviewee the Board
recorded a variety of information: their age, their racial background, the amount
of land they held (most held the standard 160 acres as per the Dawes Act),
whether or not they spoke English, what kind of schooling they had undergone,
and often some comment about their state of health. As time went on the Board
got more efficient at working out exactly what information it needed, and its
entries in the minute books which provide the main evidence for its work got
shorter and to the point.19
The information recorded by the Board reflected Bureau of Indian Affairs
policy on competency. According to the federal government, competency was
predicated on the realization that, as Francis E. Leupp, who was Commissioner
of Indian Affairs from 1905 to 1909, put it, “[l]ike their white neighbours,
Indians are of more than one sort, ranging from good degrees of intelligence,
industry and thrift to the depths of helplessness, ignorance and vice.”20
Intelligence, industry, and thrift were, in reality, quite difficult to measure. The
applications for Certificates in Competency that came into the Bureau of Indian
affairs from all over the country varied in form at different times. Some
required a report from the superintendent, answering questions about the appli-
cant that ranged from: “Is the applicant a person of good character and
reputation,” “industrious and self-supporting,” “addicted to intoxicants,” and
“has the necessary business qualifications to enable [them] to manage [their]
own affairs successfully?”21 Other forms, filled in by the applicant, asked:
“Why do you wish restrictions removed?”; “If the restrictions are removed
what will you do with your land?”; “Give the name of two business men who
know you well.”22 Other applications contained letters of recommendations,
photographs of the applicant, and even handwritten “autobiographies” describ-
ing the applicant’s life to date.23
19 National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC (hereafter NARA), RG 75,
Journal of Cheyenne and Arapaho Competency Board, January-February 1917, Entry 485. 
20 Francis E. Leupp, “Indian Lands,” 141. 
21 NARA, CCF 1907-1939, Report on Application for a Certificate of Competency for Elsie
Dardenne-Sahiler, Quapaw Agency, September 1916, Box 5, Seneca 127 (Competency).
22 Ibid., Examination of Indian Allottee Julia Adams, 1910, Quapaw Indian Competency
Commission, Box 5, Seneca 127 (Competency).
23 Ibid., Application for Competency of Arthur William Johnson, 1921, Box 5, Seneca 127
(Competency).
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Commissioner Leupp said that he put capacity for business above moral
values, education and racial descent. “In judging of an Indian’s fitness to be cut
loose from the Government’s leading-strings,” he wrote, “a broad distinction
has always to be recognized between capacity and wisdom or moral excel-
lence.” Leupp even described awarding a fee patent to a convicted murderer
who “did not even plead that he was innocent.”24 According to Janet
McDonnell, Leupp also “opposed using blood quantum and degree of educa-
tion as the criteria for determining whether an Indian was competent because
there were full bloods who could not speak or write English but who were suc-
cessful farmers, freighters, and boatmen.” Rather, Leupp said the capacity for
industry was the most important criterion for competency.25 The complexity of
the system, however, meant that it was not always Leupp who got to decide. In
his annual report for 1907 he recorded his puzzlement at some of the “curious
reasons [that] have been advanced in support of conclusions for or against the
capacity of an allottee.” Sometimes, Leupp marvelled, agents made their deci-
sions simply because an applicant “wore short hair. Others make the
educational test paramount.”26
In reality, the government’s endless discussions about criteria masked an
enthusiasm for declaring as many Indians as possible to be competent. Indeed,
the insistence of the government that fee simple patents were a reward for
acculturation and industry was undermined by the proposal, made in 1908, that
the Burke Act of 1906 be amended so that patents be forced upon an Indian
allottee who “persists in disobedience to the laws of the State … or of the
United States.” More specifically, the framers of the bill had in mind “cases
where parents refuse to permit their children to be educated by attendance at
school, and, second, to such Indians as persist in the habit of drunkenness.” The
Indian Rights Association submitted a memorial protesting against the bill,
pointing out the way it contradicted the philosophy of the Burke Act: “While it
seems that capability and competency have been heretofore the requisites to
entitle an allottee to full control of his lands, to be bestowed by way of reward
and honor on highly deserving Indians, it is now proposed to force similar con-
trol of their allotments upon incompetent and incapable Indians as a
punishment.”27 A less punitive, but similar proposal was made in 1906 that
“allottees who are blind, crippled, decrepit, or helpless from old age, disease,
24 Francis E. Leupp, The Indian and His Problem (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1910),
71-3.
25 McDonnell, The Dispossession of the American Indian, 89. 
26 U.S. Congress, House, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 60th Congress.,
1st session, 1907, 64. 
27 U.S. Congress, Senate, Memorial Protesting Against Legislation Authorizing Issuance of Fee-
Simple Patents for Indian Allotments, Etc. Senate Document 448, 60th Congress, 1st session,
1908.
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or accident, and without any visible means of support” be allowed to dispose of
their allotments.28 Neither of these policies became law, but they exposed the
government’s underlying urge to impose competency on as many Indians as
they possibly could. Protecting native land or rewarding assimilation were far
from their first priorities.
So it is hardly surprising that, according to Donald Berthrong, the
Cheyenne-Arapaho Board’s “criteria of business competency were unclear.”
Berthrong notes that many fee patents were issued to Indians who showed no
sign of “industry” — those that “pursued no vocation and lived on lease
money” and “little consideration was given to the allottee’s previous record of
handling his or her money and property.” It also seems reasonable to describe
the Cheyenne and Arapaho Board’s decision-making process as “inherently
coercive,” a phrase Janet McDonnell has applied to the competency commis-
sion sent to the Omaha Reservation in Nebraska in 1910. There, she says, the
“government issued fee patents on the basis of the commission’s recommenda-
tion without any application or consent from the individual involved and
sometimes over his protests.”29
Although the Cheyenne-Arapaho Competency Board clearly did not use
“industry” as its most important criteria, neither did they simply award compe-
tency randomly. Donald Berthrong has noted that age was an important factor.
“Of the 167 whose restrictions on the land were removed,” he says, “76.5 per-
cent were between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-nine.”30 In its minute
books, the Board described many interviewees as “old and ignorant,” “old,
ignorant and blind,” “old and deaf,” “old, crippled, ignorant,” and “old and fee-
ble” — none of the people described in this way were awarded competency.
Similarly, being able to speak English was also important. One hundred and
five of 128 people (82.03 percent) who were declared competent could speak
English or had some English. Every single person declared competent had had
some schooling, whether at one of the large, well-known off-reservation board-
ing schools, such as Carlisle, Haskell, or Chilocco, or at local schools where
they received a rudimentary education at best (the Board’s records show that
some of those who attended the latter could still not read or write English).
Significantly, Indians of mixed descent were more likely to be declared
competent. The Cheyenne and Arapaho who were interviewed in 1917 were
mostly of full Indian descent — only 5.72 percent were recorded as being of
28 U.S. Congress, House, Authorizing Noncompetent Indian Allottees to Dispose of Allotments,
House Document 80, 59th Congress, 2nd Session, 1906.
29 Janet McDonnell, “Land Policy on the Omaha Reservation: Competency Commissions and
Forced Fee Patents,” Nebraska History 63, no. 3 (Fall 1982): 405.
30 Donald J. Berthrong, “Legacies of the Dawes Act: Bureaucrats and Land Thieves at the
Cheyenne-Arapaho Agencies of Oklahoma,” in The Plains Indians of the Twentieth Century,
ed. Peter Iverson (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 44-45.
212
ONLINE JOURNAL OF THE CHA 2007 / REVUE EN LIGNE DE LA S.H.C.
mixed white ancestry. Nevertheless, statistically, an interviewee of mixed
descent was more likely to be declared competent than someone of full descent.
Twenty-five percent of those declared competent were of mixed descent, mean-
ing that a larger proportion of mixed bloods were declared competent than
mixed bloods were of the whole sample. Being of mixed descent was not an
instant path to competency, but it certainly helped to sway the Board in that
direction. This is no surprise in a climate in which racial background was so
closely connected with particular traits. Leupp was clear about his belief that
the descent Indian inherited “keenness of observation, stoicism under suffering,
love of freedom, a contempt for the petty things which lay so heavy a burden
on our convention-bound civilization” with “his Indian blood”. Meanwhile,
with “his white blood” came “competitive instinct, individual initiative,
resourcefulness in the face of novel obstacles, and a constitution hardened to
the drafts made upon its strength by the artificialities of modern life.”31
In the belief system of the period, white blood was aligned with business
competency. As Alexandra Harmon has argued, those Indians accused of
monopolizing land at the expense of their countrymen in Oklahoma were
nearly always, by both white and Indian, assumed to be of mixed descent.32
This tendency to link white ancestry with competency culminated at a fed-
eral level in April 1917 when Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells issued
his “Declaration of Policy,” which immediately declared competent all Indians
with less than one-half Indian blood, Indians with one-half or more Indian
blood who after careful examination were found competent, and Indian stu-
dents twenty-one years or older who had completed course work at a
government school, received a diploma, and demonstrated competency. Cato
Sells had taken up the position of Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1913, and
was determined from the beginning to declare Indians competent whether they
wanted it or not. From the beginning of his term as Commissioner he began
actively seeking the names of Indians who might be declared competent, order-
ing superintendents to supply lists of potential candidates and sending
competency commissions into the field to seek out those who might fulfil the
criteria for a fee patent. 
Sells was the most enthusiastic supporter of competency among the vari-
ous Commissioners of Indian Affairs, despite growing evidence that most
Indians with fee patents quickly lost their land and became destitute. It was
under Sells’ direction that, in 1916, the Indian Office began the practice of dis-
tributing patents at “last-arrow ceremonies,” which took place in front of the
entire reservation. As Frederick Hoxie has described:
31 Leupp, The Indian and His Problem, 344. 
32 See Alexandra Harmon, “American Indians and Land Monopolies in the Gilded Age,” Journal
of American History 90, no. 1 (June 2003): 113-4. 
213
STRATEGIES OF ELIMINATION: “EXEMPTED” ABORIGINES, “COMPETENT” INDIANS AND
TWENTIETH CENTURY ASSIMILATION POLICIES IN AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES 
[T]he candidates for land titles were dressed in traditional costume and armed
with a bow and arrow. After ordering a candidate to shoot his arrow into the
distance, the presiding officer, usually the agent, would announce, “You have
shot your last arrow.” The arrowless arches would then return to the tipi and
re-emerge a few minutes later in “civilized” dress. He would be placed before
a plow. “Take the handle of this plow,” the government’s man would say, “this
act means you have chosen to live the life of the white man — and the white
man lives by work.” The ceremony would close with the new landowner
receiving a purse (at which point the presiding officer would announce “this
purse will always say to you that the money you gain from your labor must be
wisely kept”) and an American flag.33
This ceremony made competency seem to be a stage in an uncomplicated
process of assimilation, but competency was, in fact, many things — it was a
legal status, a moral judgment, a recognition of business sense, and a removal
of special rights and protections that came with Indian status. Indeed, in some
cases competency had little to do with actual “competency,” industry, or busi-
ness acumen, and those awarded this status did not disappear into the white
community, but for the most part stayed on the reservation in financially wors-
ened circumstances. In the case of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Board in 1917, it was
about being young, and having some white ancestry and rudimentary signs of
acculturation. Thus, competency was part of a process of removing Indians, and
particularly Indians of mixed descent, from government supervision and
responsibility. 
The New South Wales Aborigines Welfare Board
In Australia there were similar underlying agendas to an ostensibly assimilative
policy. Exemption certificates were introduced haphazardly by some states and
not others (aboriginal policy was the responsibility of state, not federal, gov-
ernments resulting in a significant diversity among state policies). They were
never introduced in Victoria and Tasmania. Exemption certificates were intro-
duced relatively early in Queensland (1897) and Western Australia (1905), two
states with large aboriginal populations, as part of the legislative acts that set up
the protection regimes which characterized Australia’s assimilation policy in
the early twentieth century. The Northern Territory (which was administered by
the federal government) introduced exemption in 1936, and South Australia
three years later in 1939. New South Wales was the last state to adopt exemp-
tion certificates, introducing them with great fervour in 1943, along with a
significant government effort to culturally assimilate Aborigines once and for
all.
33 Frederick Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 180. 
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Rather than a widespread policy, exemption certificates were clauses in
state protection legislation that released the holder from control by that legisla-
tion. In reality, protection legislation did little to either “protect” Aborigines or
promote the cultural assimilation of aboriginal people (especially when com-
pared with the United States in the same period). Instead of allocating land or
providing funding for education, protection legislation was a system of control
and segregation which limited the lives of aboriginal people in terms of where
they could live, who was guardian of their children, how they could be
employed, and even who they could marry and associate with. Thus, the reason
why exemption certificates were introduced cannot be linked to any particular
shift in government policy or ideas about aboriginal people at a particular time.
Rather, they seemed to be a kind of escape clause — a way for politicians,
reformers, and administrators to reassure themselves that although their state
had done little to promote the assimilation of aboriginal people, if there were
some that were acculturated, there was a way for them to become exempt from
the “Act” under which their lives would otherwise be ruled. 
Being exempt from protection legislation meant slightly different things to
Aborigines from different states, depending on what controls were imposed on
them. In general, the most immediate consequence to holders’ lives was the
ability to buy and consume alcohol publicly (although it was illegal to sell alco-
hol to Aborigines in most states, a “back door” system meant that it was
nevertheless obtainable). Potential independence from control by government
officials was balanced by the inability to claim for assistance in bad times, and
the requirement that exempted persons live separate lives from unexempt fam-
ily members still living on reserves and stations. There were some advantages
to being exempted, including the possibility of being enfranchised. Neve
Grzybowicz remembered that her mother and father “were very glad to be able
to vote because if you weren’t exempted you had no voting rights … it allowed
you access to various places you couldn’t go to before, like hotels and restau-
rants.” Her sister had a more specific reason: “She had a lot of problems
because she was going out with her boyfriend at the time who happened to be
a white man. You weren’t allowed to go out with white men because it was
called ‘consorting.’ Each time they walked down the street he would get
arrested and probably spend a few hours in jail. Every time this happened she
thought, ‘Well, I may as well get exempted.’ This gave her the right to go out
with him.”34 In the post-World War II period, when New South Wales imple-
mented its system of exemption, exemption certificates became the only way
an aboriginal person could gain access to federal government welfare pro-
grams. The Social Services Consolidation Act of 1947 (Commonwealth)
34 Neva Grzybowicz (née Wilson), “Reflections on Growing Up as an Aborigine in Adelaide,”
Journal of the Anthropological Society of South Australia 27, no. 6 (November 1989): 4. 
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entitled an exempt aboriginal person to receive only government benefits such
as the old age, invalid, and widows’ pensions, as well as maternity allowances.
The linking of social security eligibility to exemption certificates “gave the
Commonwealth a convenient excuse when it was criticized for not broadening
its eligibility criteria” to cover Aborigines — the federal government could
conveniently blame the states for not having exempted more people.35
Between 22 August 1944 and 21 December 1954, the New South Wales
Aborigines Welfare Board made 648 decisions about whether or not to award
certificates of exemption to applicants.36 Thus, we see in Australia a much
slower process: the New South Wales Board took ten years to consider 648
applications compared with the Cheyenne-Arapaho Board considering 786
applications in only 36 days. Indeed, across Australia the numbers of exemp-
tion certificates applied for and granted were very low compared with the
United States. In Queensland, as John Chesterman and Brian Galligan have
argued, exemption certificates were introduced in 1896, but by the end of 1903,
only two had been granted and two refused, and “[i]n each of the years between
1907 and 1909, the number of certificates of exemption granted by the Chief
Protector were five, sixteen, and eleven.”37 In New South Wales “[o]nly 1500
applications of exemption were made between 1945 and 1964 from a popula-
tion of 14,000.”38 In Western Australia administrators “issued [only] 276
certificates of exemption, and revoked 75, in the years between 1937 and
1944.”39 In 1938 the Western Australian Commissioner of Native Affairs, A.O.
Neville, revealed that it was both official reluctance to grant exemption and
hesitation on the part of aboriginal people that kept the numbers low. He com-
plained about “well intentioned persons” who encouraged applications from
Aborigines who were “quite unfitted to be exempted.” On the other hand, he
noted disbelievingly, “[t]hen there are some few natives who scorn to even
apply for or accept exemption because they claim, and it is a doubtful claim
usually, that they have already qualified to live as whites and the suggestion
that they should be granted the privilege is felt to be an insult!”40
The considerable resistance to the exemption system among the aboriginal
community cannot be discounted. Neville found it curious that aboriginal peo-
ple who held certificates “disliked having to possess exemption certificates,
35 John Chesterman and Brian Galligan, Citizens Without Rights: Aborigines and Australian
Citizenship (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 162.
36 Some applications came before the board more than once, as decisions were deferred pending
improvements in behaviour or further information about individual cases.
37 Chesterman and Galligan, Citizens Without Rights, 55. 
38 Ibid., 179.
39 Ibid., 131.
40 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Native Affairs, 1938, West Australian Parliamentary
Papers 1, no. 2 (1938), 16.
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that is documents indicating that they are exempt form the provisions of the
Native Acts. They feel that the production of such a document upon demand
belittles them and affects their pride”41 In New South Wales, Chesterman and
Galligan suggest that the segregation of public spaces that existed in country
towns in the 1950s and 1960s was one reason “why many Aborigines refused
to surrender their dignity by applying for exemption certificates.”42 Christobel
Mattingly and Ken Hampton observed that “Nungas who were exempt resented
having to carry a piece of paper which declared them ‘honorary whites’ … this
was felt as a stigma, an invidious form of discrimination.”43 Nunga Yvonne
Cook told an interviewer that, “[m]y exemption card looks like new because I
never used it. I didn’t dare put myself in that position, in a social position where
someone could come up and tap me to ask if I had it.”44 Another Nunga, Cyril
Coaby, remembered that he never applied for exemption because he “didn’t like
the wording ‘Cease to be an Aboriginal’ … my pride was stronger than my need
for alcohol. No way in the world would I give up my Aboriginality for any-
thing. I considered it an insult to my mother.”45 In 1951, a group of Northern
Territory Aborigines of mixed descent began lobbying for their rights after a
series of arrests of non-exempt Aborigines for drinking in restricted areas of
Darwin. They formed the Australian Half-Caste Association (Darwin) who
appealed to the federal government for full citizenship. In particular, they felt
that “the exemption clause was an affront to their freedom, that they did not
enjoy security either for themselves or their children, that when asked to serve
their country in the last war they were not required to have exemption and that
they, as true Australians, did not enjoy the same citizenship rights as the New
Australians now migrating to Australia.”46
Another reason for low numbers of applications was the invasive applica-
tion process. In New South Wales those hoping to get a certificate had to fill out
41 Auber O. Neville, Australia’s Coloured Minority: Its Place in the Community (Sydney:
Currawong Publishing Co., 1947), 243-4.
42 Chesterman and Galligan, Citizens Without Rights, 179. 
43 Christobel Mattingly and Ken Hampton, Survival in Our Own Land: ‘Aboriginal’ Experiences
in ‘South Australia’ Since 1836 (Adelaide: Wakefield Press, 1988), 49.
44 Ibid., 51.
45 Ibid., 52.
46 The government’s response was hesitant. The Director of Northern Territory affairs told the
Prime Minister that the question of “restricting” the Native Affairs Ordinance “exclusively to
full-blood aboriginals, and that half castes etc. should be excluded and treated as possessing
full citizenship rights from birth” is “rather a difficult one.” Australian Half-Caste Progressive
Association (Darwin) (hereafter AHCPA), B. Damaso, Sec. AHCPA, 12 March 1951; AHCPA,
A. S. Brown, Secretary to the Administrator, NT, to Director of Northern Territory Affairs,
Department of the Interior, 9 April 1951; AHCPA, E. R. Lambert, Director, Northern Territory
Affairs, to Sec, Prime Minister’s Department, 17 April 1951. National Archives of Australia,
Canberra (hereafter NAA), Appeal for Full Citizenship Rights for Part-Aborigines, 1951-1953,
A431 1951/889.
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a form declaring that they had not been convicted of drunkenness or any other
crime in the last two years, that they understood that the certificate could be
cancelled at any time, and that they had to accept the final decision of the Board
regarding their application. Exempted Aborigines were no longer “eligible to
receive any benefit, assistance or relief” from the government. A person
awarded a certificate was, according to the Board, “deemed not to be an abo-
rigine or person apparently having an admixture of aboriginal blood.”47 Once
an application form had been received, the process became even more intrusive.
The New South Wales Board sent personal report forms to local police, super-
visors of reserves and stations, and Aboriginal Welfare officers. These
confidential reports contained information about racial caste, skin colour, fam-
ily, employment, work habits, general conduct, drinking habits, gambling
habits, thrift, morality, whether or not the applicant’s house was clean, how well
the children were taken care of, and the amount in any savings accounts. 
Despite the state governments’ urge to collect all this information about
individuals, their criteria for granting exemption certificates were vague. In
Queensland, there was a racial requirement: “[o]nly half-castes who are
civilised and have no intercourse with aboriginals can obtain them and then
only on satisfying the department of their ability to manage their own affairs.”48
The Northern Territory gave no reason at all, simply allowing the Chief
Protector to declare that “any person shall not be deemed to be a half caste for
the purposes of this Ordinance.”49 In South Australia the Board needed only to
be of the opinion that an exemption certificate was warranted “by reason of his
character and standard of development.”50 The Western Australian legislation
simply said the minister might issue a certificate to “any aboriginal or half-caste
who, in his opinion, ought not be subject to the Act.”51 But Anna Haebich
reports that a standardized form was issued to police to report on applicants for
exemption, in which, “in addition to providing details on the applicant’s name,
age, occupation and marital status, they were to forward detailed information
on his or her racial background, contacts with Aborigines and drinking habits,
and they were to assess whether the applicant had a ‘good character’ and was
‘likely to introduce alcohol amongst other natives or half-castes.’”52 Then, in
47 State Records Office, New South Wales (hereafter SRO-NSW), Aborigines Welfare Board
Records, NRS 11 Applications for Certificates of Exemption, Memo 7/4/55, M.H. Saxby to
[white hotel owner].
48 “Annual Report of the Chief Protector of Aboriginals for the year 1909,” Queensland
Parliamentary Papers 3 (1910): 12. 
49 Aborigines Ordinance 1936 (Commonwealth), section 3a.
50 Aborigines Act Amendment Act 1939 (South Australia), clause 11a.
51 Aborigines Act 1905 (Western Australia), section 63.
52 Anna Haebich, For Their Own Good: Aborigines and Government in the South West of
Western Australia, 1900-1940 (Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1992), 163.
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1944 Western Australia became the only state to take the philosophy of exemp-
tion certificates a step further. The “Certificate of Citizenship” required that an
application be submitted to a magistrate, accompanied by two written refer-
ences which demonstrated the “good character and industrious habits” of the
applicant. Applicants were evaluated as to whether they had “adopted the man-
ner and habits of civilized life” for two years previous, could speak English,
were not suffering from “active leprosy, syphilis, granuloma or yaws,” were of
“industrious habits and … of good behaviour and reputation,” and was “rea-
sonably capable of managing his own affairs.”53
In its official rhetoric, New South Wales awarded certificates to “advanced
aborigines” or to someone they thought was “a fit and proper person.”54 On the
whole, the New South Wales Board was enthusiastic about approving applica-
tions. Out of 648 decisions, it approved 519 applications or just over 80 percent
(compared with the Cheyenne-Arapaho Board’s 16.8 percent). The Board had
high expectations of exempted Aborigines, who were not only “expected to
provide homes for themselves and to live as ordinary citizens of the commu-
nity,” but should also “develop a more desirable social attitude and in due
course become a respected member of the community.”55 They were also pre-
sumably supposed to influence other Aborigines toward good behaviour and
assimilation. In reality good behaviour was the prime factor in the Board’s deci-
sion. An applicant should drink only moderately, if at all, should have a clean
home, be employed, show evidence of a thrifty nature, and be moral (although
this was not always a deal-breaker — de facto relationships, for example, were
tolerated).56 Debts, public drunkenness, a dirty or temporary-looking dwelling
were all counted as black marks against an applicant. A good reputation in the
community was very important. Thus, a prime candidate was described, for
example, as “regarded in the district as a reliable, steady worker. Her general
conduct is good and she has no known drinking or gambling habits …. [she]
bears a good character in the district, is recognized as a conscientious and will-
53 Quoted in Chesterman and Galligan, Citizens Without Rights, 132. 
54 “Annual Report of the Aborigines Welfare Board, New South Wales, 1944,” New South Wales
Parliamentary Papers 2 (1945-1946): 9-10; “Report of the Aborigines Welfare Board, 1951,”
New South Wales Parliamentary Papers 1 (1952-1953): 9; “Annual Report of the Aborigines
Welfare Board, New South Wales, 1945,” New South Wales Parliamentary Papers 2 (1945-
1946): 6. 
55 “Annual Report of the Aborigines Welfare Board, 1948,” New South Wales Parliamentary
Papers 3 (1948-1950-1951): 4. 
56 One woman’s application, for example, was approved even though her morals were viewed as
“unsatisfactory, as before her present marriage [she] was living as de-facto wife of three dif-
ferent aboriginal men.” But the Board felt that it was pointless to deny her application as her
white husband could easily obtain liquor for her anyway. SRO-NSW, Aborigines Welfare
Board Records, Applications for Certificates of Exemption, NRS 11, Memo 31/1/58.
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ing worker, is self-respecting and pays her way in the community”57 Some fac-
tors also overrode bad reports. Ex-servicemen were approved even if bad on
other counts.58 A white wife or husband also seemed to influence the Board
favourably.59
Across Australia, exemption certificates were used as a means of control.60
They could be revoked at the whim of a government official, placing many
holders under considerable pressure in their daily life. The Western Australian
Aborigines Act of 1905 contained a typical clause: “any such certificate may be
revoked at any time by the Minister, and thereupon this Act shall apply to such
aboriginal or half-caste as if no such certificate had been issued.”61 J.W.
Bleakley saw exemption certificates as a “well-earned privilege, but one that
can be withdrawn if the recipient fails to live up to its responsibilities. This is
as it should be, for even in his tribal life, the native had had to prove his wor-
thy before he was admitted to man’s estate.”62 The Australian Aborigines’
57 SRO-NSW, Aborigines Welfare Board Records, Applications for Certificates of Exemption,
NRS 11, Memo 2/7/56.
58 SRO-NSW, Aborigines Welfare Board Records, Applications for Certificates of Exemption,
NRS 11, Memo 16/10/52, A.W.G. Lipscombe to Officer-in-Charge, Police, Swan Hill, Victoria.
59 The Board noted of one applicant, for example, that she “desires the grant of Exemption as her
[white] husband’s people would wish her to be in possession of this means of allowing her to
accompany the husband where ever he goes …. [She] will not associate with the undesirable
element in the town.” SRO-NSW, Aborigines Welfare Board Records, Applications for
Certificates of Exemption, NRS 11, Memo 28/11/58. In contrast with the Cheyenne and
Arapaho Board, old age was not a reason to refuse applications for exemption. Rather, for
those of full descent, it was a reason to grant exemption because federal law said that exempted
Aborigines and Aborigines of half or less than half aboriginal descent could receive the old
age, widowed, or disability pension. Thus, granting older aborigines of full descent exemption,
even if they lived on reserves or did not conform to the usual requirements of the board, was
another way of reducing the numbers of dependents.
60 An exemption certificate could also cause some significant tensions in the life of the holder,
which are demonstrated most famously in the life of exempted artist Albert Namatjira.
Namatjira was prosecuted for supplying alcohol to members of his own community and sen-
tenced to six months imprisonment with labour. After two appeals, the sentence was reduced
to three months. Namatjira served only two months before his health began to fail and he died
of heart failure a short time later. Namatjira’s success as an artist, and the financial freedoms
that success brought with it, demonstrate the unreadiness of white Australia to find a place for
aboriginal people who were not completely dependent on, and therefore under the control of,
the government. Years before his arrest, Namatjira had come under considerable criticism from
the Aborigines’ Friends’ Association, which complained of his bad influence on others in his
community, and especially of his habit of collecting “up to fifteen men and tak[ing] them to
town” where they enjoyed his “lavish hospitality” and forgot all about “work and other mat-
ters which have a claim on us in our daily life.” “Aborigines’ Friends’ Association Annual
Report, 1950” (Adelaide: The Association, 1950), 25.
61 1905 West Australia Aborigines Protection Act, clause 63.
62 John William Bleakley, Aborigines of Australia: Their History, Their Habits, Their
Assimilation (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1961), 304.
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League, which was an aboriginal-run lobbying group, had concerns in the
1940s about the ways in which exemption certificates could be allowed,
deferred, rejected, or cancelled according to the will of a Welfare Board or gov-
ernment official. They particularly did not approve of the emphasis on good
character, which meant that a certificate could be cancelled because of one
report about any “bad” behaviour by an applicant.63
Exemption could, in rare cases, be used as a punitive measure. In 1935 a
Nunga couple were informed by the Secretary of the South Australian
Aborigines’ Protection Board that because of their “misconduct” they were
expelled from all “Aboriginal Institutions and Reserves in South Australia …
Moreover the Board will probably exempt you and your Wife …. If this course
is adopted you will not be permitted to live with or have any relations with the
Aborigines of South Australia. My advice to you is to make your home in
Victoria.”64 Similarly, Eddie Sansbury was told to leave the mission on which
he was born, lived, and worked with his large family in order to get the old age
pension. Despite his protests — “Why can’t I get my pension on the mission?
That’s what I worked for. That’s where I belong. That’s my home. Why should
I have to leave?” — Sansbury was granted exemption and was no longer
allowed to visit the mission without permission from the authorities.65
Significantly, in New South Wales in the 1940s and 1950s there was also,
as there was in Oklahoma, a similar pattern of awarding certificates most often
to those of mixed descent. 76.9 percent of applications from people of mixed
descent were awarded exemption. That said, by this time, New South Wales
was showing the results of many decades of interracial relationships. There
were, in fact, very few applications from Aborigines of full descent in New
South Wales (a mere 6.2 percent), a statistic that reflected the high proportion
of people of mixed aboriginal descent in the state. The ideal of biological
absorption is also discernable, for example, in applications that noted of an
applicant, “She shows very little of the aboriginal features,”66 or described
another as “a well built, healthy specimen of manhood, light in colour and alert
and intelligent.”67 The assumption that Aborigines of mixed descent who did not
‘look’ aboriginal no longer deserved any special rights or benefits was demon-
strated by the campaign in the 1950s to find a recipient of a scholarship to teach
an aboriginal man to fly a plane. The conditions of the scholarship contained
63 Jack Horner, Vote Ferguson for Aboriginal Freedom (Sydney: Australian and New Zealand
Book Company, 1974), 156.
64 South Australia Archives (hereafter SAA), GRG 52/1/1935/2, quoted in Mattingly and
Hampton, Survival in Our Own Land, 48.
65 Mattingly and Hampton, Survival in Our Own Land, 52. 
66 SRO-NSW, Aborigines Welfare Board Records, Applications for Certificates of Exemption,
NRS 11, Memo 31/10/55.
67 Ibid., Memo 13/1/51.
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the requirement that “[w]hile it is desirable that the applicant have a prepon-
derance of aboriginal blood, consideration will be given to applicants who are
dark skinned and have sufficient aboriginal facial characteristics to be recog-
nizable as such, despite their blood mixture.” It was clear the selection
committee did not want the scholarship to go to someone who might look white
in publicity shots.68
Indeed, the assumption that the motivation and ability to acculturate came
from white ancestry was so deeply entrenched that in Queensland actual ances-
try became a matter of perception. John Chesterman and Brian Galligan point
out that the 1897 Queensland Act made only half-castes eligible for exemption
certificates, the only way in which Queensland legally distinguished between
people of full and mixed descent; the law actually allowed the Queensland min-
ister to decide whether he wanted to treat individual people of mixed descent
as Aborigines or not.69 Darlene Johnson argues that exemption certificates
should “be read as a process of codification of identity” and argues that
“Ab/original people have learned to play the codes of exemption strategically
— a new construction of identity as masquerade, of becoming, as ‘passing.’”70
That exemption certificates were in part a reaction to the national discom-
fort when Aborigines with white ancestry were treated as unkindly as those of
full indigenous descent is demonstrated by the parliamentary discussions of the
1905 Aborigines Act in Western Australia. One member of the Assembly asked
about the “real meaning” of the exemption clause, and suggested it might be
used by white men who committed “acts of indiscretion … with [aboriginal]
women and who have had half-caste children by them” and who, because of
their “paternal instincts” hope to make them “recognised [by] civilised life if
possible.”71 In Queensland in 1939, a discussion of the wholesale exemption of
half-castes prompted Mr. Jesson, member for Kennedy, to proclaim that the
“greatest tragedy of all … is to see almost white aboriginal children sitting
amongst others totally black …. I agree with the hon. Member for Wynnum that
the quarter-castes, or the near-whites, could be readily absorbed into our popu-
lation.”72
In reality, therefore, despite the very different kinds of assimilation policy
attempted in Australia and the United States, and despite the far greater com-
mitment to cultural assimilation espoused in the United States, neither country
can be seen to have introduced the ideas of exemption and competency in order
to assist indigenous people to become truly self-sufficient and equal.
68 “Aboriginal Pilot Sought: Do You Want to Fly,” Dawn 6, no. 5 (May 1957): 14. 
69 Chesterman and Galligan, Citizens Without Rights, 40. 
70 Darlene Johnson, “Ab/originality: Playing and Passing Versus Assimilation,” The Olive Pink
Society Bulletin 5 no. 2 (1993): 21. 
71 Western Australian Parliamentary Debates 28 (1905), 319. 
72 Queensland Parliamentary Debates 174 (1939), 459. 
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Exemption certificates were not part of a general program of cultural assimila-
tion. There was little support for Aborigines who wished to become financially
self-sufficient and to live away from stations and reserves, and almost no gov-
ernment effort to ensure that aboriginal people were treated with equality in the
labour force. They were simply a method of releasing aboriginal people from
government supervision, after which they were supposed to sink or swim, or, if
they failed, to have their certificates revoked and to return to their communi-
ties.
Nor in fact, despite the rhetoric, was the system of competency really part
of the push to culturally assimilate American Indians. In the United States com-
petency was a neat solution to the pressure to turn over Indian lands to white
settlers. The Dawes Act had managed to overturn the promises made in treaties
to keep land in Indian hands, and had already released significant “surplus”
lands into white possession; competency came very near to completing this
process by opening up allotted lands to whites by removing any special protec-
tions. In Australia, where land was not an issue, exemption was much more
about reducing the numbers of aboriginal people dependent on the government
— crucially, a key component of exemption was its attempt to sever intimate
family and community relationships. Exempted Aborigines were expected to
disappear into the white community. Exemption was also a method of control
and a means of encouraging “good” behaviour and acculturation. Exemption
certificates could be cancelled at any time, and were therefore an effective
means of shaping Aborigines’ social and cultural behaviour. Thus, while Native
Americans were to be transformed (at least briefly) into capitalist landholders
and farmers, Australian Aborigines were being assimilated into leading the cor-
rect kind of white lifestyle — upholding the qualities of temperance, thrift,
cleanliness, and morality.
There is a significant difference in how widely exemption and competency
were awarded: in the United States the government made more and more fran-
tic attempts to declare Indians competent, with or without application; in
Australia there was a resistance by government officials to awarding exemption
on anything like such a wholesale scale. This difference could be partly
explained by sheer racism: by the way in which Aborigines were seen as so far
down the evolutionary scale, whereas Native Americans were burdened with
the “noble savage” stereotype and favourably compared with African
Americans. A. O. Neville, Western Australia’s most well-known Chief
Protector, was firmly against generous terms when granting the certificates. He
argued that such a policy would be dangerous; that those unready to accultur-
ate would simply “beat it back to their old haunts and revert to what they were
before — aboriginal in thought and in manner of living, and their children will
follow them into this undesirable retreat. Exemption embracing full rights of
citizenship should only be granted in the case of those completely emancipated
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— to those who live in all respects as we do and are socially acceptable, or at
least living on an equal plane beside us.”73 With its comforting “dying race the-
ory” and emphasis on biological absorption rather than cultural assimilation,
which assumed that most Aborigines would die out while those of mixed
descent would become absorbed into the white population through interbreed-
ing, Australia had far less need to utilize exemption widely. Another reason lay
in the centrality of land in the United States. The Australian government had no
need to use exemption to gain land — all but the tiniest areas had already been
stolen. In the United States, where land allocation was part of assimilation,
competency was about taxes, mortgages and leasing. In Australia, exemption
was more about personal rights (the right to buy alcohol, to travel, to be exempt
form the controls of protection legislation) and about disappearing into the
white community. Finally, both exemption and competency can be seen as reac-
tions to legislation passed in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that
were meant to provide solutions to the “Aboriginal” and “Indian” “problems.”
The Dawes Act did not transfer land quick enough, therefore the Burke Act was
passed to create a further method of land transferral. Protection Acts worked
well to control aboriginal populations, but did not contain actual opportunities
to remove Aborigines from government supervision. Exemption certificates
filled the gap.
Significantly, both countries linked the concept of competency and exemp-
tion to people of mixed descent — demonstrating that government officials
linked white ancestry either implicitly or explicitly to acculturation, and thus it
can also be argued that biological absorption was an idea present in both coun-
tries. In the United States, where biological absorption was largely irrelevant to
American assimilation policy, it is clear that the 1917 Declaration of Policy
took advantage of the large numbers of Indians of mixed descent and used
racial heritage as a means of removing their Indian status under the law.
American politicians were thus far more familiar with biological absorption
than perhaps previously acknowledged. They could hide their motives under
the humanitarian rhetoric surrounding the Dawes Act — but the success of
competency, based on blood quantum, successfully masked their biological
motives.
The different time-frames of exemption and competency discussed here
are, from the perspective of old-fashioned comparative history, almost incom-
parable. If we view settler colonialism as having a trajectory from a certain
moment, however, it makes sense that different places will reach the different
phases of colonialism at different times. And although we must also keep in
mind how the world impacts on that trajectory in particular places through
transnational ideas and discourses, the same transnational focus means that it is
73 Neville, Australia’s Coloured Minority, 243. 
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no surprise that Australia and the United States, when compared, came up with
such cynical strategies of elimination, even as they espoused their humanitar-
ian approaches and regret for indigenous suffering. Stepping back from the
boundaries of national histories helps to show us how colonialism brought
insidiously similar ideas to vastly different locations, time periods, and popula-
tions, and thus come closer to understanding the global colonial project, and in
particular the way discourses about mixed descent indigenous people worked
within it.
* * *
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